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(Dis-)Attending to the Body
Action and Self-Experience in the Active Inference Framework
Jakub Limanowski
Endogenous attention is crucial and beneficial for learning, selecting, and super-
vising actions. However, deliberately attending to action execution usually comes 
with costs like decreased smoothness and slower performance; it may severely 
impair normal functioning and, in the worst case, result in pathological behavior 
and self-experience. These ambiguous modulatory effects of attention to action 
have been examined on phenomenological, computational, and implementa-
tional levels of description. The active inference framework offers a novel and 
potentially unifying view on these aspects, proposing that actions are enabled 
by attentional modulation based on expected precision of prediction errors in a 
brain’s hierarchical generative model. The implications of active inference fit well 
with empirical results, they resonate well with ideomotor action theories, and 
they also tentatively reflect many insights from phenomenological analysis of the 
“lived body”. A particular strength of active inference is its hierarchical account of 
motor control in terms of adaptive behavior driven by the imperative to maintain 
the organism’s states within unsurprising boundaries. Phenomena ranging from 
movement production by spinal reflex arcs to intentional, goal-directed action 
and the experience of oneself as an embodied agent are thus proposed to rely on 
the same mechanisms operating universally throughout the brain’s hierarchical 
generative model. However, while the explanation of movement production and 
sensory attenuation in terms of low-level attentional modulation is quite elegant 
on the active inference view, there are some questions left open by its extension 
to higher levels of action control—particularly about the accompanying phenom-
enology. I suggest that conceptual guidance from recent accounts of phenome-
nal self- and world-modeling may help refine the active inference framework, 
leading to a better understanding of the predictive nature of embodied agentive 
self-experience.
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1  When Attending to the Body Impairs Performance
A centipede was happy – quite!
Until a toad in fun
Said, “Pray, which leg moves after which?”
This raised her doubts to such a pitch,
She fell exhausted in the ditch
Not knowing how to run.
Kathrine Craster (1871)
The “Centipede’s dilemma” nicely captures the fact that I am usually not paying attention to my body 
as I interact with the world. The poem also suggests that this may be a good thing, as such atten-
tion—triggered, for example, when one is asked how one coordinates one’s many legs—can severely 
impair one’s normal functioning in the world: the centipede certainly wants to move, yet it fails to do 
so because it directs its attention towards its body (i.e., to how the body should execute movements) 
instead of forgetting about it and just moving as usual. The suppression of the body from experience 
has been of central interest to classical phenomenology, which considers it a necessary means for 
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interacting with the world as a “lived body”. The lived body concept was proposed by Merleau-Ponty 
(Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962, and was developed by others, see Gallagher 1986, for a review) to explain, 
without resorting to Cartesian dualism, the dual role of the body as both an object belonging to the 
world, and our means (the “vehicle”) of being an experiencing and acting subject in this world. In 
brief, the lived body is our being and acting in the world; it therefore is a “lived body-environment” 
(Gallagher 1986, p. 162). In such equilibrium with the environment, the body is not an object in my 
phenomenological field—it is absent from my experience.1 Naturally, the body can be experienced via 
the senses—but this explicit, often “analytic” access to the objective body reveals “its belongingness 
to the physical realm” (Legrand 2011, p. 15; cf. Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962; Liang 2015). Husserl , the 
founder of phenomenology, described this as a “self-objectivation of the lived body” (Zahavi 1994, p. 
70). While this need not necessarily imply a total loss of the body’s subjectivity (cf. Zahavi 1994), it 
may lead to an experienced “doubling of the body, the ‘splitting of the phenomenon’ into two abstrac-
tions” (Gallagher 1986, p. 140).
An important postulate of classical phenomenology of the body is that “it is never our objective 
body that we move, but our phenomenal body” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962, p. 106). If we subscribe 
to this postulate, we can see why directing attention to the body may be detrimental to (inter)acting 
in the world: self-directed attention presents the body also as an object of experience, thus interfer-
ing with the normal experience and performance as a lived body-environment under experiential 
suppression of the physical body. This can happen in two ways: the body can suddenly appear as an 
object in my phenomenological field, such as when I bump into something, when I am exhausted, or 
when I am injured (i.e., in “limit situations”, Gallagher 1986, p. 148). In these cases, the body-as-object 
captures my attention. But similar self-objectivation can also be induced deliberately via endogenous 
self-directed attention, as in the case of the centipede. An extreme example of this is illustrated by the 
“analytical, decomposing effect” (Fuchs 2010, p. 241) of self-directed attention in schizophrenic hy-
perreflexivity, where “every action, however trifling, requires targeted attention and action of the will, 
as it were, a ‘Cartesian’ impact of the Ego on the body” (p. 247) and “the self is, so to speak, no longer 
at home in its body” (p. 251). Thus some forms of mental illness may be understood as an extreme case 
of experiencing the body as an object, which may result in a vicious cycle2 of increasing “estrangement 
from oneself ” (Fuchs 2010, p. 239)—estrangement from oneself as a lived body. Less extreme, but 
similar cases include directing attention towards automatic behavior that has not been learned, like 
falling asleep or being sexually aroused (Fuchs 2010). Such an impairment of performance by self-di-
rected attention also underlies numerous reports of professional athletes who suddenly become un-
able to perform certain long-mastered movements. A prominent case is former baseball pitcher Steve 
Blass, who had to quit his career after suddenly and inexplicably losing his ability to throw accurately. 
Presumably, just like the centipede such athletes start focusing too much on the movement execution 
itself.
Of course, how attention affects action has also long been a central empirical research question. 
Research on motor control has demonstrated that endogenous attention is essential for learning, se-
lecting, and supervising actions. However, experiments have also shown that deliberate attention to 
action execution usually comes with costs like lack of smoothness and slower, step-by-step perfor-
mance (Norman and Shallice 1986; Diedrichsen and Kornysheva 2015). For example, people perform 
and learn motor tasks worse when they attend to their execution, whereas performance increases and 
1 This has nothing to do with the awareness that one actually is a physical body per se, as this fact can be implicitly experienced without directing atten-
tion to it, just as I can be aware that I am walking without directing attention to my walking (Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962; Norman and Shallice 1986; 
Gallagher 1986). There have been some attempts to clarify why being aware of oneself as a physical body does not necessarily imply a suspension of 
the body’s subjectivity (cf. Zahavi 1994). For example, Legrand (Legrand 2011) proposes a distinction between analytic and subjective access to the 
self-as-object, where only the former implies a disruption of the body’s subjectivity by reification. Alternatively, Liang (Liang 2015) distinguishes the 
first-personal from the third-personal sense of body ownership, where the latter treats the body as an object.
2 There may be a relation to sustained attention directed from the meaning to the carrier of that meaning, as in the case of semantic satiation, where 
continued fixation or verbal repetition of a word causes the word to lose meaning (Fuchs 2010; cf. Hohwy 2012; Clark 2015).
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movement is much smoother when attention is directed away from execution (e.g. Wulf et al. 2001). 
Detrimental effects are particularly evident when attention is deliberately directed to already well 
specified (learned) movements (which may be described as a “reinvestment in movement”, Brown et 
al. 2013, p. 421), where such an internal focus of attention may enslave resources and interfere with 
automatic motor control processes or schemata (Wulf et al. 2001).
In sum, the ambiguous modulatory effects of attention to action—a necessary control mechanism 
on the one hand, a potentially substantial impairment on the other—have been examined from var-
ious perspectives, spanning phenomenological, computational, and implementational levels of de-
scription. In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that all of these levels can in principle be ac-
commodated by the active inference framework (Friston et al. 2009), a recent mechanistic account of 
adaptive behavior as being driven by hierarchical prediction error minimization which is ultimately 
aimed at occupying unsurprising states, and which appeals to a theory of brain function based on a 
universal free energy principle (FEP, Friston 2010; cf. Hohwy 2013; Clark 2015). I will first present 
an explanation of the aforementioned ambiguous effects of attention to movement in terms of active 
inference, i.e., as attentional modulation at low levels of the motor control hierarchy of the central 
nervous system. I will then examine the claim that active inference can in principle be extended to all 
levels of action and behavior—thus mapping, for instance, onto concepts like intention and cognitive 
control. I will argue that the active inference framework may help bridge the various levels at which 
attention to the own moving body has been investigated, and thus constitutes a very promising basis 
for an interdisciplinary investigation of embodied agentive self-experience.
2  Active Inference: Moving by Attentional Modulation
The FEP is built around the claim that biological agents must maintain homeostasis and must there-
fore occupy a limited range of states defined by their phenotype. Thus avoiding “surprising” states is 
the common principle underlying all behavior and cognition (Friston et al. 2009; Friston et al. 2010; 
Friston 2010). However, the state of the environment (including the organism itself) is hidden from 
the agent and must be inferred from incoming sensory information. The FEP proposes that the brain 
performs such inference via probabilistically mapping hidden causes to sensory data in a hierarchical 
generative model (HGM), where each level encodes conditional expectations (“beliefs”) about infor-
mation in the level below, with the overall hierarchy ultimately modeling the generative process in 
the environment that causes the current sensory data. By inverting this model, surprise approximated 
in the form of prediction error3 can be minimized via model (parameter) update, which is known 
as predictive coding (Friston et al. 2009): ascending data (at the lowest level, actual sensory input) 
are compared with descending predictions at each level, and only unpredicted data—the prediction 
errors—are communicated upwards. These errors can be then minimized by changing the model’s 
higher-level beliefs about the causes of this input, which corresponds to perceptual inference (Friston 
2010). Predictive coding in the brain therefore emerges as a consequence of the imperative to main-
tain homeostasis, whereby priors may be acquired and optimized by learning, or be innate and opti-
mized by natural selection (Friston et al. 2010; Pezzulo et al. 2015).
For inference to be optimal, the brain needs to decide which prediction errors are currently most 
relevant, and it needs to assign these errors relatively more weight in determining inference. Accord-
ing to predictive coding, this is implemented by adjusting the gain of prediction error units according 
to their expected precision (which corresponds to reliability or inverse variance). Thus there are two 
types of descending predictions: those of input, inhibiting error units in the level below, and those of 
precision, optimizing the gain of error units (i.e., changing the postsynaptic response of error units 
to their presynaptic inputs, presumably via NMDA-dependent plasticity, dopaminergic modulation, 
3 “Surprise” corresponds to the negative log-likelihood of the sensory data under the model and can be approximated via free energy, which, under 
some simplifying assumptions made by the predictive coding scheme, corresponds to prediction error (Friston et al. 2010).
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or other classical neuromodulators; Friston et al. 2012a; Adams et al. 2013). Precision-modulation is 
thus also a Bayes-optimal mechanism that minimizes free energy. Weighting prediction error signals 
by their expected precision determines their relative impact on inference, i.e., on updating prior be-
liefs at higher levels of the model (Friston et al. 2009). Applied throughout a HGM’s hierarchy, this 
mechanism allows for delicately balancing the relative influence of sensory evidence and prior beliefs 
on (active) inference. This top-down modulation is a contextual one that will vary depending on the 
current circumstances and requirements: “When higher levels have greater precision, their contextual 
influence dominates; whereas, when expected sensory precision is high, inference and subsequent be-
havior is driven by sensory evidence” (Pezzulo et al. 2015, p. 24). Note that the top-down, context-de-
pendent selection and weighting of (sensory) prediction errors, based on their expected precision, 
is nothing other than weighting specific sensory channels according to (expected) signal-to-noise 
ratios, the function generally attributed to attention (Feldman and Friston 2010; Auksztulewicz and 
Friston 2016). Under active inference, precision-modulation is therefore described as an attentional 
modulation (e.g. Edwards et al. 2012; Brown et al. 2013). Crucially, such attentional modulation also 
determines whether an agent resorts to perceptual inference as described above—or whether it acts.
Of course, not only can we suppress prediction error by changing our model so that it better reflects 
the state of the world, we can also change the state of the world so that our sensory input corresponds 
to our current predictions. By acting on the environment, i.e., by intervening with the generative pro-
cess itself, we can directly suppress surprise (i.e., free energy) and thus also minimize prediction error. 
Active inference (Friston et al. 2009) thus extends the principles of predictive coding (as descdribed 
above for sensory systems) to the motor system—the difference is that in the motor system, the pre-
dictions and errors are proprioceptive, i.e., they are about the posture and position of the body’s joints 
and the forces applied to them (Adams et al. 2013; Friston et al. 2012a). Active inference therefore 
explains motor control in terms of predicting states of the body as part of the “environment”, i.e., of the 
hidden process generating the current sensory data.4 Movement accordingly occurs because high-lev-
el multimodal or amodal beliefs predict counterfactual exteroceptive and proprioceptive states (sen-
sory consequences that would ensue if the movement were performed), and the proprioceptive pre-
dictions generate a prediction error in the spinal cord where they meet afferent information about 
the current proprioceptive state, i.e., movement is predicted but not sensed. Unlike sensory systems, 
where the predictions would now be revised to explain away prediction error, the motor system can 
use an alternative strategy to suppress errors: the fulfillment of proprioceptive predictions by activa-
tion of alpha motor neurons of classical reflex arcs in the spinal cord, i.e., by performing the predicted 
movement (Friston et al. 2010; Friston et al. 2011; Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013; Edwards et 
al. 2012). Thus movement results from predictions about its sensory consequences rather than from 
motor commands in the classical sense.
Under active inference, goal states for action and behavior are defined by prior expectations. Mo-
tivated or adaptive behavior can therefore be described as based on the minimization of interoceptive 
prediction error (which informs about deviance from optimal homeostatic levels) and proprioceptive 
and exteroceptive prediction error (which specifies the external goal state to be attained by action, 
Pezzulo et al. 2015). An important implication of this, one which distinguishes active inference from 
previous approaches, is that goal states are not desirable because they are “valuable” in themselves, but 
because they are states that the organism expects to occupy (under the assumption that it will always 
minimize free energy). In other words, we selectively sample sensory input that is expected, based on 
the predictions of our current HGM, to be precise—thus action and perception are intimately coupled 
(Friston et al. 2009; Friston et al. 2011; Friston et al. 2012b; Hohwy 2012; Pezzulo et al. 2015). 
4 One could say, more specifically, that defining the environment in this sense includes the physical body but not the brain that actually employs the 
HGM, as the brain’s states are (to our knowledge) not accessible to itself via sensory organs. Some interesting questions that follow from this are 
discussed by Metzinger (Metzinger 2017).
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Crucially, whether or not action occurs is determined by an attentional balancing act, i.e., attention 
weights prediction errors to optimize not only perceptual inference, but also action. Movement only 
occurs if the proprioceptive prediction errors at the spinal cord level generated by confident high-level 
sensorimotor expectations are expected to be very precise, and if simultaneously the expected preci-
sion of ascending sensory prediction error (which conveys evidence against the prediction that one 
is moving) is attenuated. Only then are proprioceptive prediction errors at the spinal level acted out 
instead of being accommodated by perceptual inference, i.e., only then are the counterfactual predic-
tions about the body’s state fulfilled rather than updated (Friston et al. 2009; Friston et al. 2011). Thus, 
in addition to confident beliefs about the sensory consequences of the intended movement, “action 
requires […] targeted dis-attention” away from current sensory evidence that one is actually not mov-
ing (Clark 2015, p. 217).
Within this framework, the detrimental effects of attention towards movement execution—re-
member the centipede—are readily explained in terms of low-level precision-modulation (Brown et 
al. 2013; Edwards et al. 2012): attending to the sensory input generated by my body increases the 
precision of the corresponding sensory prediction errors, which are conveying evidence contra the 
descending predictions of the sensory consequences generated by movement. These errors have now 
more influence on higher-level beliefs, which are therefore adjusted to accommodate the fact that I 
sense no movement. Consequently, no sufficiently precise proprioceptive prediction errors are gener-
ated, and no (or abnormal) movement results (Adams et al. 2013). Therefore, a system following active 
inference is only capable of producing movement under an appropriate balance between precision at 
high versus low levels; under abnormal precision-estimation, pathological behavior ensues, with ef-
fects varying according to the hierarchical site of the imbalance (Brown et al. 2013; cf. Edwards et al. 
2012; Friston et al. 2012a).
In sum, the act of balancing expected precision at various levels of the generative model determines 
whether a system operating on such a model resorts to perceptual inference or to action. An import-
ant (and prima facie counterintuitive) implication of active inference is that such attentional control is 
not an action but a part of perceptual inference—it is optimization of precision in a HGM that “has no 
notion of action; it just produces predictions that action tries to fulfil” (Friston et al. 2009, p.4). Action 
or behavior—a change of external states—emerges only at the lowest level of the motor hierarchy as 
a suppression of precise proprioceptive prediction error by peripheral neurons (the central nervous 
system is only concerned with perceptual inference) and an attenuation of the expected precision of 
ascending sensory prediction error. Describing the underlying precision-modulation as (endogenous) 
attentional modulation implies the Jamesian characterization of attention as something selective that 
“implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others” (James 1890, p. 404). 
Specifically, to be able to interact with the world, I need to withdraw attention from my body’s current 
state and focus it on what I predict sensing in my desired state. This conclusion is very similar to that 
of classical phenomenology, namely, that the “experiential absence” of the body is necessary for action 
in the world—being a lived body-environment—and that attention directed towards the objective 
body is detrimental to normal performance. So active inference intuitively explains why the centipede 
cannot move in terms of specific effects of low-level attentional (precision) modulation. But does this 
mechanism likewise explain why the centipede can normally move as it wishes?
3  Attentional Modulation throughout the Hierarchical Generative Model: A Motor 
Control Hierarchy
One of the greatest strengths and boldest claims of the active inference framework is its proposed 
universal mechanism operating across all levels of the HGM, which is neurobiologically implemented 
via predictive coding in the brain (and action via reflex arcs). It acknowledges the hierarchical nature 
of motor control which spans from kinematics to conceptual knowledge about the world; it integrates 
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distinct control systems (Friston 2011; Pezzulo et al. 2015), and it avoids the pitfalls of describing ac-
tion control either as purely stimulus-driven, or in purely “perceptuo-motor” or “associative” terms 
(Ondobaka and Bekkering 2012; cf. Kilner et al. 2007). Active inference thereby fundamentally relies 
on the top-down contextualizing effect of higher levels on lower ones, enabled by attentional modu-
lation based on expected precision, where a context can be a selected action, a goal, or even agency. 
Thus it aims at explaining phenomena across all levels of the motor hierarchy, from the reflex arcs that 
produce movement to intentional action and cognitive control (Pezzulo and Cisek 2016).
3.1  Sensory Attenuation and Agency
A particularly interesting implication of the active inference account is its explanation of sensory at-
tenuation, which can be observed during movement (Blakemore et al. 1998; Brown et al. 2013) and 
even during movement preparation (Voss et al. 2006). The attenuation of self-generated sensory sig-
nals during movement has previously been proposed in terms of forward models that predict and thus 
cancel out the sensory consequences of one’s movements based on the body’s current state and corol-
lary discharge (Blakemore et al. 1998; cf. Friston et al. 2012b for a more detailed comparison of these 
accounts). However, the implications of attentional balancing across the motor hierarchy as assumed 
by active inference go beyond this: as noted above, sensory attenuation is a necessary dis-attention 
away from sensory input, which would otherwise bias perceptual inference and potentially preclude 
movement (as is likely the case in the centipede’s dilemma). Active inference even postulates that sen-
sory attenuation and its effect on perceptual inference underlies certain forms of self-consciousness, 
including the experience of self-other distinction in action execution versus observation. Similarly to 
previous accounts of the mirror neuron system, active inference assumes that the brain uses the same 
HGM and thus the same action control hierarchy to model and predict the intentions, goals, actions, 
and kinematics of both one’s own and other bodies (Kilner et al. 2007). This means that high-level be-
liefs encoding action goals “do not assign agency to any particular agent” (Friston et al. 2012b, p. 539): 
these beliefs generate amodal, multimodal, and unimodal predictions throughout the motor hierarchy 
for one’s own and for others’ actions.
According to active inference, self- or other-agency—whether I perform a movement or whether I 
instead perceive someone else performing the movement—is a context determined by precision-mod-
ulation of (i.e., selective attention to) proprioceptive and visual information in one and the same HGM 
(Friston et al. 2011). If I observe an action, the visual prediction error generated by the seen movement 
will update multimodal beliefs at higher levels in the motor hierarchy, which predict visual and pro-
prioceptive action consequences. This means I must attenuate the expected precision of the prediction 
errors generated by proprioceptive predictions—otherwise I might move myself. With this attenuation, 
updating my model’s beliefs by visual prediction errors allows me to infer the cause of the observed 
movement and thus ultimately to understand the other’s intentions (Kilner et al. 2007; Friston and 
Frith 2015). Conversely, recall that increased high-level proprioceptive precision is necessary to pro-
duce movement via spinal reflex arcs. Thus “active inference presents in one of two modes; either at-
tending to sensations or acting during periods of sensory attenuation” (Friston and Frith 2015, p. 398), 
where attentional modulation is fundamentally involved in realizing both of these modes.5
Correspondingly, misattributions of agency, as in schizophrenia, have been explained by aberrant 
attention. Here, inference about the hidden causes of sensations fails because the precision of high-lev-
el beliefs is (falsely) increased to compensate for a failure to attenuate sensory prediction error during 
action. These overconfident beliefs generate additional, incorrectly confident, predictions about exter-
nal causes—the agent is not able to infer whether it caused its sensations itself, or whether someone or 
something else caused them (Brown et al. 2013). In sum, under active inference, agency is grounded 
5 However, the sense of agency in action certainly also depends on behaving in accordance with (confidently) expected states, i.e., when precise pro-
prioceptive prediction error is resolved in line with our predictions (Hohwy 2007; Hohwy 2013; Friston et al. 2013; Clark 2015).
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in the contextual influence of high-level beliefs on lower levels, which manifests itself in attentional 
modulation, i.e., in adjusting the relative gain of vision and proprioception.
3.2  Intentional Action as Adaptive Behavior
So far, we have seen that active inference provides an elegant explanation for the role of precision-mod-
ulation (attentional biasing) in movement initiation and production. However, active inference aims 
to explain all facets of behavior. Therefore even complex phenomena like the conscious selection of 
actions based on goals and intentions should be explained as driven by beliefs about behavior and 
modulated by expected precision. The proposed answer that active inference offers to these questions 
is partly reminiscent of that of the classical ideomotor theory (IMT) of action, which was developed 
as an explanation for how intentions might drive actions (James 1890; Stock and Stock 2004; Kunde 
et al. 2007). Here, I will briefly outline some commonalities and differences between IMT and active 
inference, which will reveal the novel contribution and explanatory power of active inference, but also 
some questions that it leaves open.
Most people would probably agree that an intentional action is always accompanied by a conscious 
goal representation (cf. Hommel 2015). IMT6 proposes that this conscious goal representation is in 
fact driving the action. Movement is accordingly brought about by an “idea” or “effect image” of the 
anticipated sensory consequences of that movement, which is itself the result of previous associative 
learning between movements and their sensory consequences (Hommel et al. 2001; cf. Stock and 
Stock 2004, for a review). Consequently, IMT states that, rather than there being separate perceptu-
al representations and motor commands, perception and action share a common representational 
format (Prinz 1997; Hommel et al. 2001), just as the active inference view does not distinguish be-
tween perceptual and motor representations in the classical sense. An interesting conclusion of IMT 
is that even the simplest actions are goal-directed, as they are always aimed at reaching an anticipated 
sensory effect (the “goal representation”, Kunde et al. 2007; Hommel 2015). The same holds for ac-
tive inference, where goal representations are the result of perceptual inference and correspond to 
(counterfactual) beliefs about sensory states that elicit corresponding prediction errors. Like active 
inference, IMT emphasizes that actions can only be brought about by ideas if one ignores “competing” 
ideas—most notably, the fact that one is currently not moving (James 1890; Clark 2015). In sum, both 
IMT and active inference state that a withdrawal of attention from movement execution and a focus 
onto the action goal is essential for action, thus nicely explaining the Centipede’s dilemma.7
Active inference, however, specifies its claim that movement relies on both confident beliefs and at-
tenuated sensory input by suggesting an underlying attentional modulation, implemented by increas-
ing high-level precision and decreasing low-level precision. The universal role of attention proposed 
by active inference, however, seems at odds with some extensions of IMT. For example, Hommel et al. 
2001 differentiate between attentional and intentional weighting in perception and action: 
With reference to perception, feature weighting may be called an attentional process, inasmuch as 
it selectively prepares the cognitive system for the differential processing of relevant (i.e., to-be-at-
tended) and irrelevant (i.e., to-be-ignored) features of an anticipated perceptual event. With refer-
ence to action planning, however, the same kind of feature weighting could rather be called an in-
tentional process, because it reflects the perceiver/actor’s intention to bring about a selected aspect 
of the to-be-produced event. (Hommel et al. 2001, p. 864)
6 There are of course many variations of IMT; here I will only present the basic assumptions of its classical form.
7 Experimental work has shown that even visual space is attentionally structured in this way: whereas attentional processing is facilitated in peri-hand 
space, it is impaired on the hand’s surface (Taylor and Witt 2014). The explanation may be the same: the brain prevents attention to the body to assist 
goal-directed action.
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Active inference, in contrast, specifies the intentional process as attention to intention (Edwards et 
al. 2012), where an intention is specified by a high-level goal representation. In fact, attention to action 
intention increases brain activity in supplementary motor areas that under active inference encode 
intentions (Lau et al. 2004). Active inference thus subscribes to James’ proposal that “attention creates 
no idea; an idea must already be there before we can attend to it” (James 1890, p. 450). However, it puts 
attention (i.e., precision-modulation) at the center of intentional action selection. In conclusion, un-
der active inference, goal states and intentions are defined by high-level beliefs, and selected by atten-
tion (i.e., certain beliefs are assigned more precision, cf. Friston et al. 2011; Pezzulo and Cisek 2016). 
In this light, I tentatively propose, precision-optimization at higher levels of the HGM maps onto 
concepts like “will” (defined as “the direction of action by direct conscious control through the su-
pervisory attentional mechanism”, Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 24) or “cognitive control” (defined 
as the “ability to guide one’s behavior in line with internal goals”, Jiang et al. 2014, p. 31). In fact, ac-
tive inference’s tenet that attentional allocation is based on predictions of precision is similar to the 
proposals of some Bayesian accounts of cognitive control, where “the regulation of cognitive control 
should be considered as a process of predicting the optimal amount of cognitive control required in 
a given context” (Jiang et al. 2014, p. 35). Intuitively, concepts like will or cognitive control imply an 
important function of attention in directing intentional behavior in line with one’s goals—sometimes, 
for example under distraction or uncertainty, such direction of actions will be notably harder. Clas-
sical theories of the relationship between attention and action have correspondingly suggested that 
“will varies along a quantitative dimension corresponding to the amount of activation or inhibition 
required from the supervisory attentional mechanisms” (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 24). Converse-
ly, put in the vocabulary of IMT, in situations where there is no competing “idea”, there is also no 
need for “will” (James 1890).8 Active inference likewise proposes that high-level precision is especially 
important under “cognitive conflict”, for example, in situations where multiple representations have 
high precision (e.g., at high and low levels simultaneously, Pezzulo et al. 2015). In such cases, the brain 
needs to weight a certain belief (goal representation) more strongly than other beliefs and/or more 
strongly than sensory evidence. The voluntary allocation of attention against the “resistance” of some 
other precise belief or sensory evidence could explain why we experience an accompanying sense of 
effort in these situations (Metzinger 2017).
So on the one hand, conscious experience (of will and effort) could co-vary with computational cost 
of attentional allocation. On the other hand, however, conscious experience and top-down attentional 
control need not always correspond: in certain functional motor symptoms, for example, movements 
are executed but feel involuntary. Active inference accounts of such pathological behavior (Edwards 
et al. 2012) explain it as resulting from the generation of abnormally confident intermediate-level be-
liefs. These beliefs are sufficiently high-level to generate complex movements, but are still below the 
levels associated with representing the intention to move. Thus movements are induced, however, are 
not inferred to have been intended because the resulting percepts are not predicted by higher levels. 
Hence, although these movements are produced by voluntary (top-down) attention, they do not feel 
voluntary. This explanation aligns with previous observations that there are “cases in which one ex-
periential sense of ‘automatic’ does not correspond to ‘automatic’ in the operational sense” (Norman 
and Shallice 1986, p. 19), and so some action may seem automatic while actually involving volitional 
attentional top-down control. For the centipede, the reverse case seems to be true: it does not want to 
be immobile—it wants to move!—but its voluntary attentional allocation prevents this.
Like any other account of action, active inference now faces the challenge to explain which aspects 
of motor control are accessible to conscious experience, and why. Recent extensions of the IMT have, 
for example, dropped the assumption that the action-driving ideas or goal representations must be 
conscious, and do not consider conscious experience to play a causal role in action control (Hommel et 
8 James explicitly distinguished between “ideo-motor” and “willed” acts (cf. Norman and Shallice 1986).
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al. 2001; Prinz 1997). Their conclusion is that voluntary action may well be possible without conscious 
experience (Hommel 2015). Active inference offers a convincing mechanistic theory of attention as 
precision-optimization during perceptual inference and action. Early accounts linking attention and 
motor control suggested that “the phenomenology of attention can be understood through a theory 
of mechanisms” (Norman and Shallice 1986, p. 25). However, while attentional modulation as part of 
active inference very elegantly explains low-level phenomena like sensory attenuation, its extension 
to higher-level phenomena such as intentional action does not (yet) immediately accommodate the 
phenomenology of attentional allocation in action control. Therefore, some explanatory work remains 
to be done if active inference is to fully explain all aspects of agentive self-experience: which aspects of 
volitional behavior are accessible to consciousness, and how does the phenomenology associated with, 
for example, attentional agency and conscious volition emerge from the proposed brain mechanisms? 
As one starting point, a valuable contribution, in the form of conceptual guidance, can come from 
analytical approaches to phenomenal self- and world-modeling.
4  Active Inference and Phenomenal Self-Modeling
One such candidate complementary account is self-model theory (SMT, Metzinger 2004; Metzinger 
2009). SMT is based on the assumption that the experience of being a self emerges in organisms or 
systems because they possess an internal model of the world that includes and is centered on the or-
ganism itself, which, through identification of the model with its content, experiences phenomenal 
selfhood (Blanke and Metzinger 2009). Such a model is therefore called a phenomenal self-model 
(PSM, Metzinger 2004; Metzinger 2009). There are striking commonalities between the assumptions 
of SMT and active inference (Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013; Hohwy 2013; Metzinger 2014). 
Most notably, SMT suggests a hierarchy of phenomenal self-modeling, ranging from pre-reflective, 
“minimal” self-representations like a first-person perspective, body self-identification, or spatiotem-
potal self-location (Blanke and Metzinger 2009) to complex cognitive self-representations (Metzinger 
2017). Such self-modeling can be well described in terms of active inference, whereby the “self ” (in all 
its cognitive-to-minimal dimensions) is a sophisticated hypothesis about the organism’s environment 
which is generated by the brain’s HGM, and which tries to maximize evidence for its own existence 
(Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013).
The SMT account also proposes an important universal “second-order” function of attention oper-
ating on a PSM, but a slightly different one than on the active inference view: the attentional absence or 
inaccessibility of certain processing stages of self-modeling determines the phenomenal transparency 
of the respective conscious mental representations9 and the associated experience of presence or re-
alness (Metzinger 2004). Thus mental representations are transparent because only their content, and 
not their vehicle (e.g., the brain processes at earlier stages underlying this representation) is accessed 
by attentional introspection. However, not all mental representations are fully transparent. Rather, 
they can become more or less transparent: the more a system in possession of a PSM can attentionally 
access earlier processing stages, the less transparent (or more opaque) the representation becomes. 
This means the representation is recognized as modeled: as an internal, self-generated and mind-de-
pendent construct, rather than as an invariant property of the world (Metzinger 2004; Metzinger 
2009). Transparency is thus also a “phenomenal signature of epistemic reliability” (Metzinger 2014, p. 
124; cf. Seth 2015), i.e., it is a sign of the system’s certainty that it has identified something that is real. 
Conversely, if parts of one’s PSM become opaque, this indicates the need to question their realness, 
and a possible need to revise one’s self-model.
Importantly, the SMT thereby assumes a “gradient of realness in the human self-model, with the 
bodily self being perceived as real and present while the cognitive self-model is experienced as com-
prised of representations” (Metzinger 2014, p. 123). So whereas I am (or can be) attentionally aware 
9 This does not apply to unconscious representations; in the following, only conscious representations are referred to.
Limanowski, J. (2017). (Dis-)Attending to the Body  - Action and Self-Experience in the Active Inference Framework.
In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.). Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 18. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958573192 10 | 13
www.predictive-mind.net
that my conception of myself as an industrious person is actually made (up) by my mind, I usually do 
not conceive of minimal aspects of myself as an embodied self in this way—these representations are 
in this sense transparent to me. In other words, while I can easily change some cognitive conceptions 
of myself, changes to pre-reflective representations at lower levels of my PSM like body self-identifi-
cation are far more difficult to make, and I believe they may have far more severe consequences. Note 
that although it is certainly possible to update such lower levels of bodily self-representation, as for 
example one’s perceived arm position in the rubber hand illusion, this does not imply that the realness 
of the content of the underlying (still transparent) self-representation is questioned—even in the rub-
ber hand illusion, the assumption of body-self identification holds: I still feel like a normal body with 
just one, not two right arms (Limanowski 2014; Hohwy 2013). However, I would speculate that even 
minimal self-representations, i.e., those aspects of minimal phenomenal selfhood eventually consti-
tuting the basic, bodily-founded self-experience (Blanke and Metzinger 2009) can (partly) lose their 
transparency. I further think that such a loss of transparency at low levels of the PSM may result in 
(usually temporary and reversible) pathological experience—in the worst case, I would cease to “be” 
a self (Metzinger 2004). 
In this way, SMT offers another conception of the detrimental effects of self-directed attention 
onto the bodily foundations of being a self (a lived body). The SMT view proposes that transparent 
self-modeling gives us the feeling of “being there” in the world (Blanke and Metzinger 2009; Metzinger 
2004; Seth et al. 2011; Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013; Limanowski 2014). Hence, speculatively, 
the phenomenal absence of the body-as-object can in SMT be conceived of as a form of transparence 
of the representations underlying minimal phenomenal selfhood. Conversely, once I attend to the 
body, these phenomenal representations may gradually (but will not necessarily10) become opaque—
one could rephrase this in classical phenomenological terms as a partial loss of the body’s experiential 
absence. The result could be a state in which the system experiences a certain representation of the self 
as opaque, because it recognizes, for example, that the link between itself and this particular physical 
object that is the body is actually “made up” by itself. Following Metzinger’s theory, the phenomeno-
logical prediction for such states is an experience of “de-identification” as occurring, for example, in 
depersonalization disorder (Metzinger 2004; Metzinger 2009). A similar experience is also tentative-
ly suggested by the phenomenological description of schizophrenic hyperreflexivity as an abnormal 
“reification” of the embodied self by self-directed attention, whereby “the transparency of the bodily 
medium gets lost” (Fuchs 2010, p. 242). Under such lost transparency of the lived body, “aspects of 
oneself are experienced as akin to external objects” (Sass and Parnas 2003, p. 427). Perhaps one could 
say that under pathological self-directed attention the body becomes more present and “real” as a 
physical object, just as pain becomes more present when attended to. Less dramatically, this could 
apply to cases of attention to movement execution, where transparent, or perhaps even unconscious 
representations become conscious and (partly) opaque due to endogenous attention, which interferes 
with normal, fluent performance.
However, what SMT can most notably contribute to active inference is an analysis of the phe-
nomenology accompanying various levels of action control. For instance, the transparency gradient 
assumed in the PSM may help us understand why some of active inference’s proposed attentional 
modulations are very intuitive (e.g. it is very intuitive that attending to the action goal is necessary 
to act; goal representations are high-level, and may even be opaque, cf. Gallese and Metzinger 2003), 
whereas others are not so easy to grasp (e.g. low-level sensory attenuation: do I really volitionally ig-
nore my body during movement initiation?). This could also help explaining why, although attentional 
modulation is functionally the same across various levels of the HGM, there is phenomenologically a 
substantial difference between whether I attend to the external world or to my bodily self (Metzinger 
10 Of course, SMT also entails the classical notion of attention as sharpening the representation of what is currently relevant; attending to a sensation 
can potentially increase transparency and also the “realness” of the resulting percept. However, in this case attention is directed to the content of the 
representation, not to the fact that the sensation is the content of a representation implemented in the brain (Metzinger 2004).
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2017). SMT likewise tells us why agents act as if there are desirable goals in the world where there are 
really just goal representations in the agent’s HGM: via transparent phenomenal modeling, the agent 
arrives at the conclusion “that goals, actions, and intending selves actually belong to the basic constit-
uents of the world that it is internally modeling” (Gallese and Metzinger 2003, p. 366; however, cer-
tain goal representations can also be opaque). Recall that according to active inference, the self-other 
agency distinction relies on a contextual manipulation of the influence of complex higher-level beliefs 
on visual and proprioceptive modalities. By assuming that such high-level representations as well as 
the representation of the attentional allocation process itself may be transparent, SMT provides an 
explanation of why a system operating via hierarchical inference experiences itself as an agent—or 
conversely, why it experiences another agent as the cause of its current sensory data. Thus conscious 
volition emerges when an agent integrates a goal representation as an object within a “model of the 
phenomenal intentionality relation”, a representation of an asymmetric subject-object relationship, 
i.e., of “a system being directed at a goal state” (Metzinger 2017; Gallese and Metzinger 2003; Metzinger 
2004). Attentional agency, on the other hand, is a fully transparent representation “of the process of 
selecting the object component for attention” (Gallese and Metzinger 2003, p. 374); it is the experience 
that results from identification of the agent as a whole with a particular self-representation as an “epis-
temic agent” (Metzinger 2017). 
In sum, SMT accommodates many overlaps between the active inference framework and phe-
nomenological analysis of bodily self-experience, and with its conceptualization of phenomenal 
transparency versus opacity of conscious mental representations offers a compelling complement. 
Therefore SMT also opens up alternative ways of addressing some open questions within the active 
inference framework. Active inference, conversely, offers a neurobiologically plausible implementa-
tion of hierarchical self- and world-modeling, including specific testable hypotheses about recurrent 
message-passing and precision-modulation in the brain. Phenomenological questions have already 
been addressed using this approach, for example, explaining the loss of a sense of presence due to im-
precise interoceptive prediction errors (Seth et al. 2011; Seth 2013; see also Limanowski 2014; Liang 
2015 for related discussions of phenomenological implications of experimental paradigms that rely on 
the direction of attention to specific features of the bodily self). A joint effort of active inference and 
SMT could be extremely useful in understanding how and why certain aspects of volitional action are 
conscious, and in the long run, understanding the embodied agentive self-experience in general.
5  Conclusion
Most of us will have experienced beneficial and detrimental effects of attention to action to some 
degree. Not surprisingly, the role of attentional modulation in action control—more generally, in the 
experience of being an embodied agent in the world—has attracted the interest of philosophers, phe-
nomenologists, psychologists, and neuroscientists alike. This interest has resulted in many hypotheses 
being proposed, but has also opened up many questions. Active inference, as implemented in the brain 
via predictive coding, offers a very elegant mechanistic- and implementational-level explanation of 
adaptive behavior—ultimately, as the result of a system trying to maintain its states within unsurpris-
ing boundaries. Active inference describes what happens in the brain of the centipede when it, despite 
wanting to move, cannot, due to increased attention to sensory prediction errors that preclude fluent 
movement generation. Thereby active inference proposes attention as a mechanism that balances be-
tween the relative impact of prior beliefs and current sensory evidence on inference, thus explaining 
a range of empirical and phenomenological observations of both normal and pathological behavior. 
This explanation acknowledges the fundamental role of the body for being an agent in the world, while 
also emphasizing the body as being part of the to-be-predicted environment. This is very much in line 
with classical phenomenology’s interpretation of the experiential absence of the body-as-object in the 
subjectively lived body-environment. The extension of the active inference account to higher levels 
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of action control, however, leaves open some questions about the accompanying agentive self-experi-
ence, i.e., the phenomenology of, for instance, volition or attentional agency. Here, a joint application 
of active inference-based views and analytical accounts of phenomenal self- and world-modeling can 
lead to conceptual refinement and a correspondingly enhanced understanding of the predictive nature 
of action and self-experience.
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